Compare and Contrast Thomas Kuhn and Karl Popper

Comp are and Contrast distrusting doubting Thomas Kuhn and Karl PopperPositivists regarded confirmable placard surplusd of preconceptions as the means by which facts were obtained and informed. This view, however, has been greatly con shewed since the Vienna Circles avid seeking of it. The main chores include its inability to be checked and criticised by the scientific residential area members. In former(a) words, they are subjective, fallible and olibanum unreliable.1It is this initial dis capacitance with favourableness, especially with logical positivism which prompted Karl Popper to develop his Theory of Falsifiability, a achievable action which no longer relies on induction but on deduction, which accepts that truth is non attainable and which casts theories aside which hand been refuted by unaccompanied a single piece of empirical essay. Falsification is in like manner a demarcation amidst perception and non- perception, nearlything which has proved to be ve ry controversial. Thomas Kuhn, perhaps the most well known critic of Poppers black market, does non moot in induction or deduction as methods through which perception boardes. Instead, he introduces the concept of normal acquisition, noveltyary skill and figure of speechs. The differences mingled with these twain mens work allow for be analysed, the implications of each for the conduct of kindly sciences commented upon and the work of Imre Lakatos, a twentieth century philosopher of mathematics and science, highlighted in order to decorate just how much both philosophers resonate in the social sciences as a whole.Karl Popper, Positivism and his Theory of FalsifiabilityKarl Popper was first and foremost a philosopher of the inhering sciences,2his familiarity of the social sciences existence limited basically to economics.3With that in mind, nonpareil understands wherefore he concord with Rudolph Carnap in advocating that philosophy should learn from how the esse ntial sciences solve. He believed scientists should adopt a tiny attitude, go forthing to incessantly test their views with empirical evidence and rational discussion which the Vienna Circle had so avidly promoted. However, Popper was briefly to highlight flaws with positivism, especially with logical positivism. These were, in crabby, its dedication to the principles of inductivism and verificationism.Inductivists cl determination that via induction, unmatchable is able to obtain secure scientific noesis and that the inference is legitimate if a significant number of singular or observational statements are gathered under a wide pastiche of circumstances.4In order to maintain the empirical certainty of inferences obtained through the deductive method, the universal law premise must be empirically certain.5However, as Popper pointed out, unrivalled has no assurance that any universal empirical marriage offer is certain. For Popper, the problem of induction was insurmount able, contesting that if science is empirical its laws must be handle as tentative hypotheses.6Popper accepted the Humean critique of induction, claiming not except that it is never apply by scientists but that observation, believed to be an initial step in the construction of theories, is misguided7. Hume too pointed out that observation is selective and supposition-laden and therefrom one can never make pure or free observations.8Popper, however, disagreed with Hume over whether knowledge could be rationally justified. Hume saw inductively inferred laws as except an account of habit or custom, (suggesting that) even scientific knowledge is irrational.9Popper, on the other hand, in order to avoid statements allowing empirical evidence to actualize false theories, believed that induction could be switch overd by deduction. Deduction draws inferences about the set forth from the ob resolved falsity of the conclusion.10To justify this, he argued that though even with a bod y of empirical evidence, one can never be abruptly certain about the validity of a scheme, it takes but one empirical rebuttal to determine the falsity of a speculation. Popper denominated this the asymmetry between verifiability and falsifiability11, a difference which became the centrepiece of his philosophy of science.Scientists begin with universal statements and initial conditions from which they descend hypotheses which will then be after tested. If they withstand the test, the theory will survive if falsified, the theory is abandoned. Falsifiability, according to Popper, is the bill of demarcation between science, or the empirical sciences and the non-science. There are, however, degrees of falsifiability. The more information a statement contains, the big its body of observational statements and therefore, the higher its degree of misrepresentation. According to Popper, scientists should aim at highly refutable theories instead of modestly falsifiable ones. It is pr eferable for the theory to be bold, precise and simple12as their empirical content will be greater and therefore there will be a humongousr body of potential falsifiers.Poppers definite break with logical positivism appears in their seem of certainty the positivists aimed to specify methods that would generate certain knowledge13whilst in Poppers view, one can only hope to improve what must al elans remain imperfect14as emerging tests could cast doubt over what was previously thought of as true. If we take Poppers approach to the appear for truth, it would initially appear that there are an endless number of possible true theories.15However, Popper addresses that by explaining his tone of verisimilitude. The scientific process of trial and erroneousness which Popper advocates creates a greater approximation of the truth, or increases the verisimilitude of the theory.Popper, Marxism and Pseudo-ScienceThe young Popper had been draw ined to the apparent long suit of theories such as Freuds psychoanalysis and Adlers individual psychology. These theories were regarded as capable of explaining or so all(prenominal)thing related to human behaviour as verifications were found to justify every advancement. Popper, however, was soon to discover a study flaw in them they could not be refuted. Freud was therefore severely criticised by Popper for producing immunised theories against defense. A theory unable to be falsified belongs, in Poppers view, to a non-science. His drastic approach towards pseudo-science was also extended to Marxism, especially the Marxism that Neurath had brought to the Vienna Circle.Neurath interpreted Marxian materialism as epsitemically analogous to his own physicalism16and hailed Engels and Marx as having produced the foundations of a truly scientific necessitate of society. In Poppers opinion, this could not have been further from the truth. The problem with Marx was not only that he was considered a historicist, but that he was a u topian too.Marxism, initially considered as a science because of its predictive nature, was soon re-classified as fundamentally non-scientific. The predictions Marx had made had not been borne out and in order to save it from falsification and refutation, ad hoc hypotheses were added, making the theory compatible with facts. These factors prompted Popper to adopt falsifiability as his criterion for demarcation between science and non-science. If a theory, according to Popper, is capable of being falsified or, in other words, is incompatible with empirical evidence, it is considered as scientific. If, on the other hand, a theory is compatible with all observations and is capable of explaining virtually everything be it because, as with the case of Marxism, it has been modified to accommodate sorely made observations or, because, as in the case of psychoanalysis, it is indeed consistent with all observations made and to be made in the future, it is categorised as unscientific.17It is this criterion which characterises Poppers theory of falsifiability and which was soon criticised.Implications for the hearty SciencesPopper helps demolish one of the notions positivism embraces, namely that science bestridees from the observation of data by means of experiments. These experiments are verified when repeated allowing cosmopolitan laws about the nature of reality to be inferred. Popper, therefore, expresss that progress is made not by verifying facts, but by attempts of falsifying the results of other theories.18The theories of science, he argues, are conjectures to solve problems and cannot be verified by empirical evidence.19The counterchange from induction to deduction also means that rather than proceeding from the particular to the universal, science originates from the universal (i.e. scientific hypotheses) to the particular.20SanderThomas Kuhns Theory of ParadigmsThomas Kuhn began his career as a physicist and then turned his attention towards the accoun t statement of science where his preconceptions about instinctive history were shattered21. His Structure of scientific Revolutions (1962) was developed as an attempt to give a theory more in keeping with the historical situation as (Kuhn) saw it22. foreign Popper, his main aim was not to bequeath guidelines to scientists about how to proceed or to develop a normative philosophy of science. The telephone exchange concern of his dissertation was to characterise the way in which science historically develops and to explain why scientists have operated in such a way.Kuhns Structure of scientific Revolutions has been one of the most provocative (pieces of work) to appear in the last fifteen historic period23, offering the most sophisticated alternative to Popper.24Science, in his opinion, does not progress inductively as positivists would maintain nor by falsification as Popper would argue. Alternatively, Kuhn places focus on the revolutionary character of scientific process, where a revolution involves the abandonment of one theoretical structure and its counterchangement by other, incompatible one.Kuhns approach to the way science progresses can be summarised by the following open-ended system of rulespre-science normal science crisis revolution new normal science new crisis25According to Kuhn, the pre-science stage is a disorganised and diverse activity forgo the formation of science. It eventually becomes structured, directed and channelled when a single mental image emerges and is adhered to by the scientific fellowship. As will be discussed below, the concept of ranges itself has been subjected to heavy condemnation, not least because of its ambiguous nature. However, vaguely, one can postulate that paradigms contain some very general methodological prescriptions26to guide scientific work. Paradigms also serve a regulative function in directing future research.27 body of workers at heart a specific paradigm whether it be Newtonian mechanic s or wave optics practise what Kuhn denominates normal science.As professed in Structure of Scientific Revolutions, normal science isresearch firmly based upon one or more past scientific achievements that some particular scientific community acknowledges for a time as supplying the foundation for its further practice.28 average science is inextricably characterised by a dominant paradigm, something that Popper quickly picked up upon as irrational and superficial.29In normal science the scientists work is employ to the articulation and wider application of the accepted paradigm.30In other words, their main aim is to fill out what is suggested by the accepted paradigm.31It is therefore clear that minuscule emphasis is placed upon normal science and research to produce major novelties as a primary aim.Kuhn, in effect, reduces Poppers falsification theory to problem solving deep down the confines of normal science. According to Kuhn, science is besides a set of puzzles whose soluti ons are to be found within the operational paradigm32. Normal scientists do not actively look for anomalies which the content of their paradigm will be hard-pressed to solve. However, when a recurrent anomalousness does arise which the paradigm is unable to resolve, crisis will break out.During such a crisis, extraordinary science occurs characterised by a plurality of views and a gainsay to the fundamentals of the paradigm. The crisis will then be resolved when a exclusively new paradigm emerges which has the capacity to resolve the previous, problematic anomalies and, in doing so, attract the allegiance of a growing scientific community until eventually the paradigm posing the problem is abandoned. Therefore, the new paradigm not only has to be able to resolve the anomaly, it also has to be subsequently accepted as normal science, thus establishing a new consensus. A scientific revolution according to Kuhn is constituted by discontinuous change33as the pertly adopted paradigm will be confronted with problems it is unable to resolve and thus the never-ending cycle continues.Kuhn and PopperThe Structure of Scientific Revolutions soon became problematic to cook up with Poppers theory of falsification as Kuhns historical account about how scientists operate came into conflict with Poppers work. The emphasis Kuhn placed on scientific communities, their rules and expectations, was used to explain why scientists were not al slipway willing to refute and actively search for falsifications of their theories. Unlike what Popper claimed, the scientific communities would not question the paradigm they work within until a particular anomaly was repeated. Instead, they might question their own calculations or instruments implemented, but never the broader framework they operate within.34Poppers reaction to Kuhns severe criticism was veritably weak. He simple asserted that Kuhns accurate historical account of science clashes with the facts as I see them.35According to Kuhn, falsification has not been in use in the past for the reasons highlighted above. Poppers rebuttal to this was that he, unlike Kuhn, had not focussed on providing a historical account but on providing guidelines for future scientists. He also criticises Kuhn for producing a highly selected theory, one which disregarded large chunks of normal science. 36Popper also criticised Kuhn for paving the way for irrationalism and relativism,37the reason for this lying in two of Kuhns statements. Firstly, the fact that Kuhn equated the switch in paradigms to a gestalt switch or a religious conversion because he believed in a holistic theory of meaning38means that it is very difficult to compare scientific theories. Secondly, because of Kuhns cynical approach to verisimilitude and his belief that we never get closer to the truth, his commentary on how science progresses seems ill-founded. In these contexts, Popper criticises Kuhn of adhering to the myth of framework which presupposes tha t rational and critical discussions can only take place if fundamentals are agreed upon. Popper strongly disagrees with this concept, as with the belief that science will not progress across paradigms and argues that different frameworks always have enough in cat valium to allow the scientific community to compare and judge them, triggering progress.Other Criticisms of Kuhns WorkPopper has not been alone in criticising aspects of Kuhns Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Bernstein succinctly puts the legal age of the criticisms in his The Restructuring of Social and Political Theories39. The ambiguous nature of paradigms and the irrationality of the paradigm shift have been discussed above. Critics have also pinpointed Kuhns misrepresentation of the history of science40, the inaccurate description of normal science41and the exaggerated distinction between normal and revolutionary science42. In order to further show the relevance of Kuhns work to the social sciences, the vagueness of paradigms will be discussed, as the irrationality of paradigms has been explained above.When first introduced, Kuhn claimed paradigms were universally recognised scientific achievements that for a time provide model problems and solutions to a community of practitioners.43However, the elusive and slippery concept44of paradigm was shown when Kuhn acknowledges that he had been using the term paradigm in many ways45, citing Masterman who listed at least twenty two senses in which the term was used in the book.46To tackle the confusion created by his multiple use of paradigms, Kuhn proposes to replace it with a disciplinary matrix.47A disciplinary matrix includes the shared commitments of the community of scholars, the shared symbolic generalizations and the shared problems and solutions in the discipline.48Mark?Other Implications for Social Scientists.Even though Thomas Kuhn has been almost exclusively concerned with the natural sciences, social scientists have repeatedly claimed his work offers fresh illumination for brain social sciences and theory.49Part of the reason for this is, as Kuhn himself pointed out, the fact that his work is regretfully too nearly all things to all people.50The revolutionary transformation in the use of observation as a means leading to theory has also had an collision on social scientists. Kuhns starting point for the formulation of theories is not reality but construction.51Kuhn contributed to demolishing positivism52not only by admitting revolutions in science involve the intrusion of non-scientific elements such as habits, customs or cultural values, but also in roll doubt over the possibility of attaining perfect knowledge and over the conventional idea that progress in science is cumulative.One of the most authorised consequences Kuhns work had for the social sciences was the significance he attributed to the role convergeed by the sociological characteristics of scientific communities. Kuhn turned away from the sea rch for an ideal methodological analysis to the study of science by scientific means and, in doing so, shake the empirical study of science.53Finally, Kuhn may have hastened the demise of positivism by prompting and then influencing the naturalisation of epistemology, a movement which has become bountiful through, for example, a conventionalistic and naturalistic study of science.Imre Lakatos A Middle Man?By the late 1960s a great deal of the debate on the philosophy of science had come to focus on the difference between Kuhns paradigms and Poppers revision of positivism.Numerous epistemological doctrines entered this debate and different interpretations of Popper and Kuhns works emerged, reflecting the impact they had on their contemporary critics and their effect on the conduct of social science as a whole. Lakatos is one of the most prominent critics of their works, his critique mainly considered as the most important attempt to place the post-empiricist theory of science som ewhere between Popper and Kuhn.54Imre Lakatos at the outset appears to be a frequenter of Poppers falsification theory. He strongly criticised Kuhn for his irrationalist and too general55concept of a revolution and his notion of a single, dominating paradigm. Lakatos defends Popper against the charge of naive falsificationism, the fast discarding of a theory as soon as contradictory evidence is exposed. However, he goes beyond Popper in claiming that science progresses by sophisticated falsification which focuses on the comparative evaluation of whole research programs.56Sophisticated falsificationists agnize that the conditions that a hypothesis should satisfy in order to be notable of a scientists consideration alone are insufficient57and that the need for a hypothesis to be more falsifiable than the other it will replace is necessary for scientific progress. Thus, it is not single theories which are falsified but full(a) programs, embodying the notion of refutation not aut omatically lead(ing) to rejection.58Such an epistemic theory strikingly resembles Kuhns theory of paradigms. The difference between them only appears when closely examining Lakatos notion of research programs.According to Lakatos, every scientific research program has a hard core, a set of propositions that are immune from empirical tests59because they are surrounded by a protective belt of assumptions or conditions.60though research programs and paradigms have been equated, Lakatos proposes that normal science be considered more as a research program for reasons of its general acceptability61and does not attribute the general status to it that Kuhnian paradigms have. Furthermore, the transition from one research program to another is the product of rational exploration of rival methodologies62and not, as Kuhn implied, a incomprehensible conversion63to a new ontology. Cultural values, historical events and other impertinent factors are far less important in Lakatos eyes and play l ittle part in particular scientific theories or the excerption of general research programs, levelling Kuhns theory down to critical rationalism.64Lakatos MSRP has not emerged without beguiling criticisms. Firstly, he seems to have physics exclusively in mind when he developed his theory and when referring to science. Other natural sciences cannot as easily be accommodated to the Procrustean bed of the MSRP65and it is only economics which seems to offer the possibility of an easy fit.66As a model for the history of science, MSRP fails to meet the empirical test of general acceptability67. It is also limited in explaining how science works, failing to excogitate the criteria needed to be employed for it to work. However, as Gordon highlights, the fact that Lakatos was flexible in not regarding former scientists as misguided in adopting theories that now would be considered irrational is a significant point of merit in Lakatos epistemic stance.68The MSRP model allows the possibilit y of gaining knowledge by using theories that are subsequently regarded as, in the absolute sense, false.69ConclusionAs Lakatos claimed,The clash between Popper and Kuhn is not about a mere technical point in epistemology. It concerns our central intellectual values, and has implications not only for theoretical physics but also for the underdeveloped social sciences and even moral and political philosophy.70As seen with Sanders account, Popper has greatly influenced the political sciences, contributing to xxxx. Kuhns work, on the other hand, as Mark smith rightly points out, has had a deep impact on the conduct of social sciences because of the vagueness and therefore adaptability of the term paradigms.71Despite their distinct approaches, however, both men have met with severe criticism, not only from each other, but from scientific colleagues and both have apparently failed to address these adequately.72It is therefore not surprising that xxxxxx